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Preamble: Explanatory structure and the mind-body problem 
 
Let us start off with two claims: a) despite the indubitable dependence of the mind on 
the brain, attempts to account for higher consciousness in physical terms seem to be 
locked within a hall of mirrors; b) even if this state of affairs is indeed illusory, the 
fact that the illusion holds indicates that its cause cannot go away. Some philosophers 
have found good reason to disagree with these claims. Nevertheless, this is not the 
place to unpack their conceptual content, nor to explain how they fit together, and for 
the sake of what follows I ask you to take them as given. They can be reformulated in 
this way: the minute one starts enquiring in scientific terms into the nature of 
emotional awareness, the sense of self through time, abstract thought - attributes of a 
distinctly human, as presumably opposed to animal, consciousness - one gets stuck in 
the rut of a frustrating explanatory structure which keeps the explanandum at bay. 
Questions begin about what exactly are ‘qualia’ (the what-is-it-likeness of, say, 
feeling pain, or being hopeful, or beholding the face of a loved one); about the nature 
of the relation that firing neurons may bear to abstract thought and memory; about 
how the putative neurological correlates of the viewer’s response to a beautiful 
painting, piece of music or poem can account at all for aesthetic experience. The 
effort to think about the nature of consciousness as anything but the dynamic, 
perpetually elusive, intrinsically subjective phenomenon that it is, creates a closed 
circle which disappears as soon as one puts down the tools of logic and looks away 
from the rational structures produced by the very mind that fails to catch its own 
reflection. 
 
This sort of idea continues to be hotly debated within the modern philosophy of mind, 
although it is also an ancient, enduring assumption (the ‘rational soul’ was never 
supposed to be the object of empirical analysis). It can still breed disquiet in some, 
excitement in others, or, as it may be, straightforward boredom. But the phenomenal 






the sense of having a mind, of being conscious, is far from trivial. None the more 
trivial is the question of whether this difficulty is built into the framework of our 
naturalistic explanations by necessity, or is only a contingent, psychological outcome 
of the history of scientific explanation. Consciousness is an elusive subject-matter, 
and might remain attractive for that reason; but questions around it have an import 
because they point to an ethical concern with the power and the limitations of today’s 
proliferating scientific enquiries into the nature of human nature. Specific mental 
functions can surely be analysed in great detail, down to the cellular and molecular 
levels; brain imaging techniques enable the empirical testing of possible correlations 
between neurological and mental events as well as the identification of functional 
structures; genetics help trace cerebral development and its lineage in non-human 
animals. But such neuroscientific studies of discrete functions yield only discrete 
knowledge. They do not require an overall theory of consciousness in order to make 
sense. They might point to one, but it is not their job to tell us how disparate mental 
functions fit together to create the experience of human subjectivity, from its grandeur 
to its miseries. Cognitive scientists, for their part, do recognize the human mind’s 
essentially ‘metarepresentational’ nature, but assume that, rather than ask how 
exactly, the functions they identify are implemented in the physical brain. In all these 
cases, an explanatory gap remains. The irreducible human subject of fictional tales 
and humanist study stays out of the scientific picture; and there is no clear reason to 
believe that science would be better off if that weren’t the case. 
 
Given this, and given the two claims we began with, it is my contention that 
interesting answers to the epistemological questions raised by the neurological and 
cognitive sciences may surface if one takes a close look at past accounts of mind, 
cognition and emotion - that is, at old mirrors, unearthed by the practice of history, 
whether they are still reflective, or partially dulled, or darkened and cracked. This is 
what I endeavoured to do in my doctoral thesis, and it is what I aim to do in the book 
I’m beginning to write here. While the beauty of philosophical, conceptual thinking is 
entrancing, the historical myopia that often accompanies it can result in much tail-
biting. It occurred to me some years ago that the history of psychology and 
epistemology might usefully be fed back into current debates about the status of 






scientific accounts been informing philosophical speculations about issues like the 
self, consciousness, volition, perception, emotion, and so on. Yet, as I recounted in the 
thesis, the seventeenth-century separation of the life sciences (which used to be called 
natural philosophy) from epistemology (which, more or less until Locke, belonged to 
the realm of psychology) was a historical, contingent event, and perhaps not, at least 
not straightforwardly a necessary one.  
 
Indeed, the difficulty remains today of integrating scientific explanation with open-
ended philosophical quandaries. (The ‘application’ of the cognitive sciences to the 
response to works of art partakes of a similar dichotomy - hence the ‘art and 
cognition’ connection.) There exist many efforts to do just that; but theories of 
consciousness flourish, without, on the whole, convincing fully. Think of the problem 
as an empirical fact rather than as a philosophical puzzle: if one has ever engaged in 
psychotherapy, or meditation, or any form of disciplined introspection, one is bound 
to be struck by the fundamentally mysterious nature of the ‘self’ that can at once, or 
successively, tell the story, live the lie, recreate the truth - yet remain recognizable to 
itself as a single identity through time. Symptoms of various cases of brain damage 
can pose to researchers and witnesses the problem of reconsidering the nature of what 
seem integral features of this self, such as its temporal continuity, its spatial 
awareness, its body-image and so on. But most of us have the potential to build our 
private mind-body problem, to wonder what it is about the brain that creates such a 
problematic entity as the human, self-conscious mind. Our ordinary experience of 
ourselves as an agent capable at once of contemplation, accounting and confusion, at 
once of thought and of the fumbles around thought’s lapses, takes place within a blind 
spot.  
 
Despite, or perhaps because of this blind spot, there is a clear tendency, which I 
suggest might be a universal feature of human psychology, to represent to ourselves 
the existence of this unifying, one might say proprioceptive faculty as a central, 
conceptually fixed core. Rather than dismiss this tendency as a chimera, a mere trick 
we play on ourselves, it might be worth analysing it. Depending on the scheme and 
the historical period, the core we imagine might be a homunculus in the brain, a ghost 






within the mortal body brought into life through means beyond its willed control that, 
in certain cultural contexts, might give rise to the thought that there is an immortal 
soul, or, failing that, a ‘mind-body problem’, a ‘problem of consciousness’, a 
mysterious essence - which turns out, like the Cheshire cat, only to appear when one 
wonders about its nature and location, then to disintegrate into a mocking smile and 
disappear into thin air once the problem ceases to be posed. But it is perhaps this 
impulse - this feature of our psychology - that in part constitutes consciousness. 
Arguably, it is what produces positive, scientific theories about body, mind and 
nature, including humoural theories - instances and enactments of the 
metarepresentational mind. It is what is producing this very paper. It is in fact possible 
that all of us here, engaged as we are with the knitting of cultural memory, are 
practicing what memory itself actually is: not the storage place we so easily imagine it 
to be but the dynamic process at the heart of consciousness, the constant re-creation of 
our perceptions and explanations in the light of what we seize within the fleeting 
present.  
 
It is tempting to think instead of memory as static and of explanations as fixed, 
hovering over the objects they explain. But it is erroneous and illusory, just as it is 
misleading to use an explanatory account in order to fulfil our anxious, persistent need 
for teleology, for believing that the putative mechanisms by which, say, we are able to 
write poems is the fixed, stable reason for which we write poems. This need might 
also explain the attraction such practices as astrology continue to exert widely, even 
on a population exposed to sophisticated scientific knowledge. Without some sort of 
philosophical training or innate, vocational scepticism, it is easy indeed to fall for the 
simplest explanatory structure - for the static solution - and to confuse it with the thing 
that it (only ever partially) describes. Similarly, the very use of reason and explanation 
can turn most of us into unsuspecting Cartesians, surreptitiously leading us to 
experience our thinking selves as disembodied intentional minds, rather than as 
physical, embodied creatures. Accounts of the conditions under which we are such 
intentional minds can themselves end up confining the mind within its own creations. 
In this way, there persists, very well camouflaged, an anti-naturalist dualism within 
our thought habits, which may to some extent explain why otherwise insightful 






teleological imagination into the complete, just-so stories then found on newspaper 
science pages, either lauding or denouncing their own, reductively deterministic 
versions of evolutionary psychology and the like.  
 
This is the more febrile agenda behind my continued focus on the explanatory gap 
between scientific accounts and the phenomena accounted for. What informs this 
enquiry is not in the least a relativist stance with regard to the value and truth-value of 
science, but quite the opposite, a wariness with regard to the human mind’s handling 
of scientific data - or, for that matter, of any data necessarily construed as positive, of 
any coherent answer to an open question. Such a wariness is the starting-point for 
epistemological puzzlement. Although I resort to the philosophy of mind and to 
cognitive psychology to unravel this puzzlement, what I offer is a historical account 
of the psychology of the scientist. I argued in my thesis that an equivalent of the 
explanatory gap was at the heart of the complex way in which the mind-body relation 
was conceived after Descartes, and I then proceeded to reconstruct the relevant 
debates of the late seventeenth-century in the discreet but diffuse light of that concept. 
I use a similar methodology for this new project about humours, animal spirits and 
their cognates, with an eye to telling a story hopefully free of anachronism but able to 
help us understand how deeply our theories of mind and nature stand within a 
historical continuum. Concepts of humours, animal spirits and the like survived major 
shifts in the history of science and remained present, in one guise or another, well into 
the post-Cartesian age. It is my starting hypothesis that the long-lived theories which 
make use of these concepts are instances of our need to localize our functions, 
pinpoint where the ghost within might dwell, name it and master it - that they are an 
outcome of cognitive processes which might be universal. The book will attempt to 
chart the structure of these theories and ask what they might imply about our minds. 
 
There follows the first chapter of a first part, written, as will be the rest of the book, in 
as non-academic a style as I could muster - and without footnotes. It analyses the 
reliance of the Galenic understanding of emotions, and of their relation to reason, on 
humoural physiology. The issue of how to account for emotions, for our awareness of 
them and for our capacity to act upon them is central to the programme delineated 
above and indeed central to any understanding of the nature of consciousness.  
